The Evershed Report and English Procedural Reform by Clark, Charles E.
THE EVERSHED REPORT AND ENGLISH
PROCEDURAL REFORM
CHARLES E. CLARK
LAST July the Lord High Chancellor presented to Parliament the
Final Report of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and
Procedure, already commonly known as the Evershed Report from its
chairman and principal draftsman, Sir Raymond Evershed, the dis-
tinguished Master of the Rolls. This is a bulky, close-printed docu-
ment of 380 pages, available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office
(Cmd. 8878) for the price of eleven shillings net. And it is a mine of
information, certainly worth much more than its modest cost, to any
student of procedure and procedural reform. In fact it seems to this
reviewer quite the best account available of day-to-day high-court ac-
tivities and the problems thereof in that country from which we take
our law.
It is interesting, but not too strange, that this is so. Obviously the
Report was not written for the instruction of American lawyers who are
not likely to look to such a source for their information. Yet the Com-
mittee was observing a going system which it was set to improve; and
to explain what it was studying and would change, it had to set forth
the existing system. And so this is a report direct from the firing line
presented in a reasonably objective way, though perhaps not un-
naturally tinged with the conservatism we expect from lawyers and-
to perhaps considerably less degree-from the English people gen-
erally. Thus if Americans wish to know the operation of the English
circuit or assize system, the reasons for the lengthy oral arguments
before the Court of Appeal, the impingement of the automobile on the
staid High Court of Justice, the activities of barristers and solicitors,
of "leaders" and "juniors," indeed a multitude of other practical activi-
ties and problems of English justice, here is the place to find it. One
could have wished for an index; American readers are likely to
flounder if they seek to locate discussion of a particular topic. But the
difficulty is mitigated by a Complete Summary of Recommendations
and Conclusions in twenty-four pages and 229 paragraphs near the end
of the Report; and the style is not too dreary for a meaty report to
make reading it through too painful.'
Charles E. Clark is Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
1 In fact there is considerable liveliness in the interstices of the discussion; one
might almost feel that our English brethren, for all their love of pomp and circumstance
which leads them to tolerate and pay for outworn court symbolism of various forms, yet
like a quiet jest at undue solemnity. In particular they appear to have an addiction to ex-
pressions which border on the cute: the "leap-frog" scheme of appeal direct to the House
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Beyond the voluminous and complete character of the Report it-
self and the inevitable debate as to the efficacy of its recommendations,
several other features may arouse the interest of American readers.
First is the nature of the Committee itself. It was appointed by the
Chancellor on April 22, 1947. During its six years of activity its per-
sonnel had surprisingly few changes for one whose number was so
large and so distinguished, with many members carrying obvious bur-
dens of both public and private character. Its number was twenty-
three, including three High Court justices in addition to the chairman,
with representatives from the barristers, leaders as well as juniors,
solicitors, King's Bench and Chancery Masters, together with members
of Parliament (including Labor members), accountants, directors of
the Bank of England, a civil engineer, writers and scholars. Ameri-
cans may like to recognize, among others, their illustrious compatriot,
Professor Arthur L. Goodhart, Master of University College, Oxford,
and editor of the Law Quarterly Review; Sir A. P. Herbert, the noted
author; Mr. Geoffrey Crowther, editor of The Economist; and Profes-
sor T. H. Marshall, famous political scientist of the London School of
Economics.' So far as this reviewer is aware, nothing like so varied and
yet withal so distinguished a group of talents has been brought to the
service of law reform in this country, though the explanation lies (in
his judgment) in lack of invitation, rather than lack of willingness
to serve.
Next we may remark on the low cost of the entire operation. The
estimated cost of preparation of the Report and the three interim
reports already published, including the expenses of the Committee, is
£1,883, 15s., l1d., of which £1,381, 16s., 10 2d. is the estimated cost
of printing and publishing the reports.3 In American ventures of at all
comparable nature, budget items for travel expense and hotel bills for
committee meetings would run far beyond such sums, not to speak of
such general costs as salaries and stenographic, clerical and publica-
tion expenses. Even with the savings resulting from the general cen-
tering of all things legal in London, the completion of so substantial a
of Lords, eschewing the Court of Appeal; the "preliminary canter" of the American pre-
trial conference; and the repeated exhortation to lawyers and judges for a more "robust"
exercise of powers and authority already conferred or now recommended or brave hopes
that they will now be "robustly" applied. Such expressions occur throughout the Final
Report.
2 One may perhaps comment on the substantial impact of that School upon pending
procedural reform. Of the four members who filed a minority Addendum, calling for
greater action-discussed below-three owe allegiance, either by present activity or
prior training, to that School, while the most acute criticism of the Report to date comes
from Professor Gower, as also discussed below. Lord Chorley's interest is well known;
much of the present activity is previewed in his article, "Procedural Reform in England"
in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 98 (1949).
3 Cmd. No. 8878 at 2 n. (1953).
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task at a total expense of a little over $5,000 and a cost of printing of
less than $4,000 seems truly amazing.
A third item deserving of notice preliminarily is the nature of the
task set before and accepted by the Committee. For its prime focus
was the cost of litigation. Specifically in its Terms of Reference from
the Lord Chancellor it was directed to "enquire into the present prac-
tice and procedure of the Supreme Court... and to consider what re-
forms of such practice and procedure should now be introduced,
whether by legislation or otherwise, for the purpose of reducing the cost
of litigation and securing greater efficiency and expedition in the des-
patch of business." 4
Commissions or committees to work for the improvement of law
administration are not a new thing in English history. During only the
present century there appear to have been some half dozen directed to
the activities of the High Court of Justice, not to speak of others con-
cerned with lower courts or specific subjects of law or legal justice.
In fact this Committee's Terms of Reference required consideration
of the activities of two such bodies. First were the three reports in
1933-36, Cmd. 4265, 4471 and 5066, of the Hanworth Committee on
the Business of Courts under the chairmanship of Lord Hanworth,
originally Master of the Rolls. This Committee was "to consider the
state of business in the Supreme Court, and to report whether greater
expedition in the dispatch of business, or greater economy in the ad-
ministration of justice in the Court, is practicable." 5 And the Peel
Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business at Common Law,
1934-36, under the chairmanship of Earl Peel, was concerned, as its
name indicates, with the fusion or division of courts "with a view to
greater despatch" of court business; its Report, Cmd. 5065, was made
in 1936. Each of these bodies, composed of leading High Court jus-
tices and King's Counsel, with overlapping personnel in the shape of
Baron Hanworth, the Master of the Rolls, and Sir Claud Schuster, the
Lord Chancellor's Permanent Secretary for the Courts (later Baron
Schuster), gave its attention to organization and calendars of the High
Court Divisions. In certain aspects they disagreed, for example as to
the absorption of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divisions into
the other two divisions of the High Court. The Evershed Committee
takes up in greater detail these same problems, with many additional
ones. Its general trend, like that of the Peel Commission, is against
present change in the court structure so long as the divorce jurisdiction
4 Id. at 4.
5 Cmd. No. 4265 at 3 (1933); Cmd. No. 4471 at 2 (1933); Cmd. No. 5066 at 2
(1936). The variation in the spelling of "dispatch" may be an English indlosyncrasy.
See notes 1 and 4.
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remains as it is, although it does concede a rather strong case for an
Admiralty and Commercial Court.
It will be noticed that this, though the "Final," is also the fourth
Report of the Committee. The three interim reports, from 1949 to
1952, were briefer in scope and accomplishment. The first, Cmd. 7764,
issued in 1949, is the most important; it recommended some expansion
of the jurisdiction of the County Courts, chiefly by extending the limits
from a maximum of £200 to 1300, and it made suggestions of fixed
dates for trials in the High Court-an important and troublesome
problem, indeed.' The second, Cmd. 8176, issued in 1951, dealt with
admiralty and chancery procedures and had some interesting sugges-
tions for reducing the bulk and making manageable the English "White
Book" or Annual Practice.7 The third, Cmd. 8617, in 1952, dealt with
a particular local court.8
How well has the Committee accomplished its over-all task?
Enough has been said to indicate the completeness of the Report and
the scholarly nature of its attention to details. And the number of its
specific recommendations is great. The 229 numbered paragraphs of
recommendation already referred to, in cumulative force are undoubt-
edly substantial. True, some are not extensive, touching such matters
as permission to a witness to sit while giving testimony; some are nega-
tive, such as rejection of the American system of pre-trial or of written
briefs on appeal. But the sheer bulk is impressive. If candor compels
an expression of some disappointment that the Committee has stopped
with measures less than bold, yet lack of boldness must be considered
an occupational disease of reformers. Any one who has watched or
participated in the slow and halting progress of reform in this coun-
try will realize that there are very few in a position to cast stones. And
such a judgment is only that expressed by the four minority members
in their Addendum and apparently by the Committee's own public and
constituency. As Professor Gower observes in his able critique, dis-
cussed below, "professional reaction to the final report has been a mix-
ture of disappointment and relief."'
6 See Gower, Interim Report of Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Proce-
dure (Cme 7764), 12 Mod. L. Rev. 483 (1949). See also 99 L.J. 493 (1949); 203 L.T.
149 (1949); 16 Sol. 223 (1949); 93 Sol. J. 568 (1949); and Gower, The Cost of Liti-
gation, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1954), which is discussed in the text below.
7 It also discussed certain other procedures, as that of the Court of Protection and
before Official Referees, as well as "Court Fees"--their nature, amount and taxation.
See Cmd. No. 8176 at 52-60 (1951). See also 14 Mod. L. Rev. 325 (1951); 101 LJ. 171(1951).
8 The Durham Palatine Court. See Gower, The Cost of Litigation, 17 Mod. L. Rev.1 (1954).
9 Gower, supra note 8, at 2, referring "to a general feeling that the recommendations
are less far-reaching than are needed and had been expected." Of how many American
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In attempting to give American readers some idea of the nature of
this Report, and its wealth of information for students of procedure
and reform, it is not my purpose to indulge in an extensive discussion
and criticism of the recommendations presented. Such an attempt
would be presumptuous; we do not have and cannot have the full
knowledge of all ramifications of the problem to make the assay of
value. I shall limit my review to such matters as seem of interest and
point in our American setting. Nor will I try to deal with all or even a
majority of the recommendations; here, too, I shall endeavor to set
forth only some main trends, stressed by the Committee, as high lights
of its proposals and efforts.
In its own appraisal the Committee seems to put most emphasis
upon what it names and defines as the "New Approach." This appears
to be an attitude of litigants, which necessarily means of counsel, to-
ward the development of "less costly litigation'-an attitude which is
to be urged strongly in any event, but is to be encouraged particularly
through the device of the originating summons procedure. In the words
of the Report, "To encourage a 'new approach' towards less costly liti-
gation-(a) the originating summons procedure should be made more
generally available and an analogous new procedure (by writ) should
be introduced for use particularly in the Queen's Bench Division, and
(b) the powers of the Master on the summons for directions should be
considerably strengthened."10
The background of this recommendation was a finding by the
Committee that for the simplest High Court witness action lasting
about one day the taxed costs will be not less than between £150 to
£200, one-third being numerous very small items and the balance con-
sisting of the solicitor's "instructions for brief" and counsel fees."
reports could the same be said I See also Goodhart, The Cost of Litigation, 69 L.Q. Rev.
463 (1953) (a note by the Editor); Elliott, Judicial Administration, 1953 Annual Surv.
Am. L. 814-15, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 155, 156 (1954); Keeton, The Evershed Report on
Practice and Procedure, 20 Sol. 213 (1953); 216 L.T. 365 (1953); 103 L.J. 471, 490
(1953); 97 Sol. J. 499, 580, 598, 617, 646, 676 (1953). Both Professors Gower and
Goodhart refer to an address by Lord Cooper, Lord President of the Court of Session,
to the Society of Public Teachers of Law in September, 1953, which has not been avail-
able to the writer.
10 Cmd. No. 8878 at 37 (1953).
11 Cmd. No. 8878 ff 77 (1953). See also id. ff 682, where it is said that the success-
ful party will probably not need to pay his own solicitor, in the absence of special
circumstances, more than £25 to £130 beyond the taxed costs thus recovered. Professor
Gower, concluding that "[tlaking the lowest figures this means that the loser will have
to pay 329," goes on to say, "Anyone with experience will agree that this is an un-
usually low figure for a disputed Queen's Bench action, and that in most cases the loser
will have to pay at least twice that sum." Gower, supra note 8, at 18. It is hard for an
American to imagine having to pay $1,800-$2,000 for the privilege of losing a "relatively
small action" or "the simplest" witness action in a court of general jurisdiction. See also
Mullins, In Quest of Justice, c. 11, The Lawyer's Bill (1931).
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And this was supported by the further findings that the bill of costs
increases directly with the passage of time and the costs increase
directly with the length of time occupied by the trial. Hence some
way was sought, by encouraging the parties to disclose at an early
stage the true nature of the issue between them, to expedite the setting
down of an action and to curtail the length of trial. But since "exhorta-
tions" to adopt a "new approach" may by themselves be inadequate,
something more is necessary to remove the "screen" behind which each
side marshals his forces for the day of trial and the other may not
penetrate. So the Committee carefully examined the possibilities of a
new approach, which, by removing this atmosphere of secrecy, would
make a stock-taking process natural and at the same time eliminate
many of the steps now taken almost as a matter of course before trial.
This new approach is to be achieved in two ways: first, by change in
the initiation and later conduct of a segment of cases in the High Court,
and second, for cases where this is inappropriate, by a strengthening of
the summons for direction and the Court's ancillary powers.
The first step involves a further development of the "originating
summons" procedure, now used in the Chancery Division in a certain
group of cases such as those for the construction of a deed or other
written instrument and for declaration of rights under it, and the
establishment of an analogous (though not identical) new procedure
by writ in the Queen's Bench Division. In either case the main features
of the new procedure seem to be two: first, a less formal and more
expeditious method of initiating the action than by the older writ of
summons; and second, a further procedure whereby the plaintiff's
statement of claim, supported by affidavits, will justify him in asking
a Master to set down the action for trial, very likely in the short cause
list, without further pleadings. Excepted from these procedures are to
be cases of fraud, slander and the like, and in the Queen's Bench Di-
vision, the important personal injury actions (except those asking for
approval of a settlement involving a person under disability). The
actions thus eligible for it are those involving construction of a statute,
regulation or document; or where the sole or principal question is of
law; or, under the originating summons procedure, where there is no
substantial dispute of fact or where evidence can be given by affidavit;
or, under the analogous new procedure by writ, where the action can
be properly tried on affidavits . 3
When the Committee turned, for the remaining actions, to the
strengthening of the practice of "the summons for directions" before
a Master, it expressed consciousness "of treading again a well-worn
12 Cmd. No. 8878 Ufi 77-80 (1953).
13 Id. 1111 8 -103.
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path."' 4 For recommendations of a similar import had been made in
the Hanworth and Peel reports; and it might have added that the
practice has been widely discussed and admired in America, where it
served as a stimulus to developing the "pre-trial" procedure, best sym-
bolized by the famous Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 5 But the first thing the Committee does is to consider and reject
(for compelling reasons of cost, as we shall see) the American pre-
trial, the procedure for discovery b examination successful in British
Columbia, and the summons for immediate relief used in South Aus-
tralia. Of course certain of the matters to be settled by the Master on
giving his directions do parallel Federal Rule 16, and undoubtedly
these experienced court officials do assist in the simplification of the
case and the expediting of the trial-prime objectives of the American
device. But the Committee concurred with the Peel Commission in
holding that the summons for directions should be generally heard by
a Master, and not a judge. In this and in other ways, coupled with
the outright rejection, it showed it was not ready for the American
system. Perhaps its most interesting suggestion here is toward certain
attempts to limit expense; a suggestion for later consideration that
taxable costs should be limited to one fee for counsel and solicitor on
a summons for direction, save where the Court otherwise directs in
exceptional circumstances; a provision that the Master should certify
whether or not the case is fit for the employment of two counsel, and a
limitation of taxable costs accordingly; and a declination of any at-
tempt to settle the lawyer's fee bill to his own client. 10 Interesting,
also, is the discussion and rejection of proposals for both more detailed
and less detailed pleadings, for more and for less discovery, and so on.17
To an American observer the trend and direction of these recom-
mendations seems unmistakable and in the same general direction to-
ward which are headed such advanced American systems as the federal
courts and the American states which have adopted the federal pro-
cedure. 8 But it seems only correct and proper to say that they appear
14 Id. f 209.
15 See, e.g., Greenbaum & Reade, The King's Bench Masters and English Interlocu-
tory Practice (1932); McCormick, Lights and Shadows in English Justice, 18 A.B.A.J.
608 (1932); Millar, A Septennium of English Civil Procedure, 1932-1939, 25 Wash. U.LQ.
525 (1940); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 229-36
(1952) ; Clark, Cases on Modem Pleading 529, 530 (1952). The literature on the Ameri-
can pre-trial-monographs, essays, articles-is already so voluminous as to defy citation.
16 Recommendations appear in Cmd. No. 8878 ff 246 (1953). See also id. lUft 209-46.
17 Id. 1111 105-208.
18 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of course apply in the far-flung system of
federal courts, including those of the District of Columbia; beyond this they have been
fully adopted and apply in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico and Utah, and, for both courts of law and equity,
though separately adopted for each, in Delaware. Substantial portions of the practice,
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to constitute in total effect a somewhat halting and less than forthright
approach to the end really in view. Recalling the long leadership of
England in procedural reform, and particularly in initiating such steps
as the summary judgment and the summons for directions,10 one may
well feel that there is some falling off in boldness of attack. The pro-
cedures of the new approach seem hardly as effective as the now com-
plete summary judgment of the American jurisdictions noted; more-
over, without the direct and immediate control of the judge, successful
operation of the system may actually go no further than the exhorta-
tions to the parties and counsel may accomplish-a weak reed, indeed!
And the complications of the process seem enough to slow it down-
representing a tendency away from the simplification of process, plead-
ing and court structure which is a keystone of our ideas of reform in
law administration."0 Instead of one simple form of process and plead-
ing directed to bringing the action before a single court, we see here
in the High Court alone (not to think of the County and other courts)
a total of four processes and procedures, two each for each Division
of the Court. The lines of demarcation must be clearer than have
seemed possible in the history of procedure or else entanglement seems
indicated.
The Committee points out that it has been concerned, "almost
entirely," with civil procedure.2' But even on its own terms as to scope,
American experience in court reform would suggest a further and ma-
jor omission, namely, as to court organization and simplification of
structure, together with the establishment of a directing head. With us
the argument for the "integrated" court, covering all divisions of court
operation and subject to central control through an administrative
notably the discovery section, and to a lesser extent that of party joinder, have been
taken over in widely separated states, e.g., Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Washington; individual federal
rules have been adopted in other states, such as California, Connecticut and North Da-
kota; while the pre-trial rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, has been quite widely adopted. See
Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 Ohio St. L.J. 241, 243 (1953);
Clark, The Federal Rules in State Practice, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 520 (191).
19 On the former see Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L.J. 423
(1929); Millar, A Septennium of English Civil Procedure, 1932-1939, 25 Wash. U.L.Q.
525, 536 (1940). And for the American practice see Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36
Minn. L. Rev. 567 (1952), and the many references given in Clark, Cases on Modern
Pleading 502, 507 et seq. (1952). On the former, see note 15 supra. Compare in general
Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1926);
Clark, Code Pleading 17-21 (2d ed. 1947).
20 This has been often discussed in American legal literature; see, eg., references
given in Elliott supra note 9; Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System, 48
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1953)) ; 1953 Conference of Chief Justices, 26 State Govt. 241 (10g3) ;
Clark, Code Pleading 54-71 (2d ed. 1947). For references to particular court reorganiza-
tions, see note 22 infra.
21 Cmd. No. 8878 ff 5 (1953).
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office and under the direction of a chief justice, has been found com-
pelling; and the examples in New Jersey and Puerto Rico suggest the
real accomplishments of such a reorganization of the judicial system."
The Committee's assignment to consider practice and procedure in the
Supreme Court of course tended to confine the scope of its activities.
Thus the fact that another committee had just reported extensively on
procedure in the County Courts23 undoubtedly served to stress the
existing boundaries. But complete separation of course proved im-
possible and this Committee did make recommendations covering the
extension of jurisdiction of the County Courts and broadening the ap-
peals therefrom to the High Court. 4 Moreover, the Committee does
consider extensively the organization of the High Court, notably with
respect to distribution of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divi-
sions and with appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the House of
Lords, although it concludes against any change of structure.25
Since the Committee shows that it was somewhat intrigued by the
American devices for simplification of the litigious process, as well as
similar projects from Canada and Australia, why was not more of an
attempt made at comparative evaluation and possible choice for experi-
mentation at least of those which seem most promising? Such a course
would have been most profitable for American reformers. It must be
conceded that a great deal of our planning must look to the future for
proof, since it lies still so largely in the realm of endeavor, rather than
accomplishment. Certainly none of us can afford to brag unduly or to
point with too much pride to an execution which is yet far short of
22 Vanderbilt, The Reorganization of the New Jersey Courts, 34 Chi. Bar Record
161 (1953); Clark & Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court
Reorganization, 61 Yale L.J. 1147 (1952); Snyder, New Puerto Rico Judicial System Is
Modern and Efficient, 36 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 134 (1953); Clark & Clark, Court Integra-
tion in Connecticut: A Case Study of Steps in Judicial Reform, 59 Yale L. 1. 1395
(1950); Clark (E.), Realistic Court Reform-A Study of Pending Proposals, 27 Conn.
B.J. 11 (1952).
23 This was a Committee on County Court Procedure, headed by Austin-Jones, J.,
with Final Report, Cmd. No. 7668 (1949). See comments in 12 Mod. L. Rev. 354 (1949) ;
99 L.J. 241, 255 (1949); 206 L.T. 84 (1948); 207 L.T. 291, 307 (1949); 16 Sol. 153
(1949); 94 Sol. J. 543 (1950). Its interim report, Cmd. No. 7468 (1948), was com-
mented on in 11 Mod. L. Rev. 470 (1948).
24 See note 6 supra, referring to Cmd. No. 7764 (1949); also Cmd. No. 8878 5H
552-61 (1953). The recommendation for more extensive review on the facts is critizcd
in Gower, supra note 8, at 11, 12, 19. The proposals for sound recording, Cmd. No. 8878
1 560 (1953), are similar to, though not as far-reaching as, those adopted in the P.R.
Judiciary Act § 19, II 4 (1952), discussed in Clark & Rogers, supra note 22, and Snyder,
supra note 22.
25 Cmd. No. 8878 11 472-564 (1953), dealing with Rights of Appeal; id. fI[ 565-630,
Procedure on Appeal; id. 1f11 874-923, Distribution of Business in the High Court. Its
proposals for "leap-frogging" the Court of Appeal and going direct to the louse of
Lords on certificate of a judge of the High Court in a limited class of cases appear In
the earlier section, id. 111 483-504, 510(c), 517, 537, 543, 562.
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promise. But if the general level of objective is as yet quite dis-
couragingly low, there is still enough reaching for the stars to give a
lift to the entire movement; and it would have been exhilarating to
have found support from our leaders of the past. The answer may be
found in the limited Terms of Reference for the Committee's activities,
which were originally defined by the Chancellor as not to include the
question of fusion of the profession and were so interpreted through-
out.26 But as the minority's Addendum2 7 shows, a request for more
extensive attack could have been made and it could have been but-
tressed by conclusions drawn from the extensive investigations it had
conducted. The failure to attempt it highlights one of the key prob-
lems now presented in English legal and professional life-the present
organization of the legal profession and its effect on the prime question
before the Committee, that of the cost of litigation.
In rejecting the American pre-trial conference the Committee
pointed out the general agreement that for its successful operation it
needed not only judges of some skill and experience, but also lawyers
of competence to represent their clients completely, even to the point of
full admissions as to details of their case. s This meant, so the Com-
mittee concluded (quite inevitably), that the litigant's solicitor must
brief a team of barristers not merely for trial, but also for the "pre-
liminary canter" of the pre-trial. And this meant in many cases actu-
ally doubling the already heavy burden of counsel fees (taxed, as we
have seen, against the losing side) and, in all cases pretried, a very sub-
stantial increase. Small wonder that the Committee, whose task it was
to reduce the cost of litigation, paused."0 And the caution thus shown
seems to be identical with that disclosed in other parts of the Report.
It may seem to be drawing too extensive a deduction to hold, from
the reasons for its conclusion here stated, that respect for the tradi-
tional division of the profession into solicitors and barristers was so
completely a restraining influence as to prevent even consideration of
revamping of the court structure. Quite probably a statement here in
terms of cause and effect is too sweeping; rather the cause may be in
traditional respect for settled institutions which requires that both
profession and courts be left untouched. Nevertheless it seems clear
that a crusading spirit as to one would have carried over to bring
about a reform of the other. But such an experienced observer as Pro-
26 Id. 11I 24, 29, 765.
27 Addendum by Sir Thomas Barnes, Air. Crowther, Dr. Fletcher and Profesor
Marshall, id. at 314-18.
28 This is surely true; it is illustrated by a recent American case of diqn L-al of an
action for want of such representation at pre-trial. Stanley v. City of Hartford, 103 A.2d
147 (Conn. 1954).
29 Cmd. No. 8878 1111 214, 223 (1953). See particularly id. 9 221.
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fessor Gower, noting the important effects of the "divided profession"
on the cost of litigation, has this to say: "Reading the Evershed Re-
port one is struck by the number of fertile proposals which had to be
rejected solely or mainly because of the divided profession. " 0 As
examples he lists not only the pre-trial conference already considered,
but also appeals by filing written briefs and limitation of costs on the
basis of a proportion of the amount at stake. Both of these are of such
interest as to deserve further comment.
On the use of written briefs the Committee had the advantage
of hearing evidence from Mr. Justice Frankfurter and John W. Davis,
from whom they gained an impression of by no means wholehearted
favor for the American system and some envy of the system of un-
restricted oral argument, not possible in American courts in view of
the amount and pressure of appellate work. The Committee thought,
too, that the English system of unrestricted oral argument led to
greater unanimity of opinion and less dissent. But the strongest ob-
jection, in its view, rested upon the absence of anything like American
legal firms, permitting of team work in the preparation of briefs, and
the need that all court activity be conducted by the barrister.31 So
here its recommendations are limited to such matters as cutting down
upon the long and tedious practice of reading even formal written docu-
ments at the opening of an argument of perhaps several days' duration
in the Court of Appeal."2 The writer is bound to say that he is not as
convinced as are many of his colleagues of the virtues of oral argu-
ment, quite possibly because it is rarely presented by an advocate ap-
proaching the training and grace of an English barrister; he fears, too,
his patience would disappear on the oral reading of long documents
more quickly perusable in chambers. But be that as it may, one con-
cludes that the system disclosed is designed for more leisurely days
where expense was less. This, too, it seems, is a type of legal proce-
dure not adjustable with ease to the automobile and airplane age.3
The question of costs is of course quite crucial. In England, as
we have seen, the principle of substantial indemnity is followed to pro-
vide for recovery of counsel fees and litigation expenses as a part of
the taxed costs. As between party and party, costs are taxed at a
somewhat lower rate than prevails in the case of solicitor and own
30 Gower, supra note 8, at 22.
31 Cmd. No. 8878 ff 574 (1953) ; see generally id. gIg 568-75.
32 Ibid. See also id. 111 583-98. Suggestions for limitations -upon the reading of re-
served judgments in open court are contained in id. gg 599-601.
33 The automobile appears to have hit the High Court, for the Report is concerned
with the fact that more than 40 per cent of all actions tried in the Queen's Bench Di-
vision are "personal injuries actions," id. ff 58; and a special Section, V, id. lilT 32 1- 7 2, is
devoted to the discussion (and substantial rejection, as impracticable or otherwise un-
desirable) of various procedures for the more effective disposition of such cases.
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client costs, so that not all the cost of a lawsuit is thus recoverable by
the winner. But this system is quite other than that prevailing here,
where our statutory taxable costs have become largely nominal over
the years and without connection with the value of the litigation. 34
The Committee considered various plans from abolishing the English
system of indemnity to control of the own client relationship, and a
minority at least favored a Canadian system of costs proportionate
chiefly to the amount at stake, but with some regard to the time in-
volved. Eventually, however, it contented itself with recommending
retention of the existing system subject to some minor improvements.3
So as to the employment of counsel its recommendations are limited.
It will be noticed that in a case worthy of the attention of a Queen's
Counsel, he must be accompanied by a "Junior," so that there is re-
quired on each side, in addition to the solicitors and any additional
expert aid, such as accountants, as may be needed in particular types
of actions, two highly trained barristers. The Committee did make
some suggestions for reducing the taxed costs where a Master ruled
that two counsel were unnecessary and with certain other reductions
in special instances, of which the two most important are a reduced
scale of "refresher" fees after the original retainer and a descending
fractional scale in place of the present "two-thirds" rule under which
the junior is entitled to a retainer equal to two-thirds that paid his
leader." These recommendations, it is said, are those which have been
received with the "least exithusiasm" by members of the BarYT
Here, however, the four minority members of the Committee
would go much farther in various steps for control of this most sub-
stantial part of the cost of litigation. Thus they would abolish the two-
thirds rule entirely and permit reimbursement to the junior on the
same basis as to the leader. They attack the anomaly of the absence of
any contractual relationship between the barrister and the lay client
and the absence of direct legal liability to the person to be served who
must foot the bills. They also suggest, as do indeed the majority, that
the question of partnerships between barristers is worthy of considera-
tion. And finally, while accepting the ruling that consideration of any
proposal for fusion of the two branches of the profession was outside
the Committee's Terms of Reference, they went on to say that it "ought
34 The classic exposition is in Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849 (1929). See also
Cmd. No. 8878 1111 764-873 (1953), and note 11 supra; Note, Use of Taxable Costs to
Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Col. L. Rev. 78 (1953).
35 Cmd. No. 8878 111 678-763 (1953). For recommendation of some litigation at
public expense, see id. 1111 631-77.
36 Id. f111 764-873; see also id. g 246; for the minority views see id. at 314-18.
37 Goodhart, The Cost of Litigation, 69 L.Q. Rev. 463, 464 (1953). And see also
Gower, supra note 8, at 2, 14.
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to be considered forthwith by an appropriate body constituted for the
purpose with appropriate terms of reference," and that if that was
undertaken two other questions of equal importance should be exam-ined, namely, the reorganization of the circuit system and decentraliza-
tion of the Supreme Court. And they go on to point out how closely
the existing system is tied to the division of the profession and suggest
that decentralization of court business would imply a fundamental re-
organization of the profession.3
"Among the suggestions which are being canvassed some such as
fusion of the legal profession, and the decentralization of the High
Court are hardy annuals." So said Lord Chorley when he was with us
in 1948.11 In discussions of reform in England, these questions come
up recurringly. Many writers and distinguished advocates have recom-
mended fusion; but it is obviously a subject to be approached gingerly.
It reminds me of the difficulty in my own state of Connecticut of at-
tacking the firmly entrenched probate fees from estates as the support
of the entire system of probate courts-a system likewise to the ad-
vantage of the few who are richly rewarded and to the disadvantage
of the many who are not and of the general public which bears the
cost.4° That system, however, lacks the positive benefits of the English
plan where a superior brand of legal service is afforded for those who
can afford it. Surely every judge must envy the English organization;
for his British colleague is at all times attended and advised by highly
competent lawyers, the reverse of our system, where the ablest law-
yers tend to eschew the courtroom for the greater rewards of office
practice. But the English system seems truly aristocratic both in the
sense of its high standard of competence and in its limitation to the
few. We are told that, while solicitors generally are busy, 80 per cent
of the barristers are not, and it is said that there are not more than
perhaps 100 really successful barristers; but the example and the hope
suggested by the 20 per cent minority and the forces of tradition are
such that the profession does not support fusion.41 So the exponents
of reform in law administration have usually limited themselves to say-
ing that (a) fusion must come, (b) it will not come soon, and (c)
nothing can really be done to hasten it.42 Even Professor Gower, who
38 Cmd. No. 8878 at 314-18 (1953) (addendum by the four minority members),
and see also id. ff 28. Professor Gower's discussion, supra note 8, at 13-17, is valuable
here as elsewhere.
39 In his essay, supra note 2, at 112.
40 Discussed in articles cited in note 22 supra.
41 Gower, The Future of the English Legal Profession, 9 Mod. L. Rev. 211, 232
(1946); Whitney, Inside the English Courts, 3 The Record 365 (1948); 21 Tenn. L. Rev.
32 (1949).
42 Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England 200-02 (1940); Mullins, In Quest
of Justice 403, 411-19 (1931) ; Chorley, supra note 2, at 112.
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at one time looked upon fusion as a near-possibility if aided by a shove
from the Government, now seems to think that view overoptimistic,
and is disposed to settle for lesser reforms.43 Even admitting the
strong pressure against change, this does seem to us a little strange;
for have not the English been willing to attempt many things for-
bidden to American reformers ranging from reorganizing industry to
remaking the medical profession? Moreover, as we know, they are
engaged in extensive plans now to supply aid through governmental
help to indigent persons, the legal aid scheme, which, as the Committee
points out, tends to worsen the lot of those in the middle income
brackets." And finally what is left to a reformer if he may not hope
and dream and plan in the light of dreams? For sometimes he does
wake up to find that his dreams have surprisingly come true. That is
the way of reform.
At any rate, Professor Gower's lesser proposals4 certainly are
worthy of careful study against the background of the Report itself.
They are an attempt to provide for the decentralization of the High
Court before fusion. Their heart is the conferment of unlimited juris-
diction on the County Courts, with limitation of the original civil juris-
diction of the High Court to cases where both parties agree to the case
being heard there, and with appeal from the County Court on questions
of law only.40 The basic step of substituting the County Court as
the main trial court would seem sound; there is little reason for dupli-
cating courts unless one is to be made in some way aristocratic, the
dispenser of more expensive justice. Bringing the courts back to the
general public and away from the present centralization in London is
in line with modem American theories. It should be noted that the
concept of an integrated court is not the same as that of a centralized
court, operating in a single metropolitan area. It is a directed court
43 His original prophecy of the approach of fusion was contained in his article,
supra note 41, which called forth interesting comments in 81 Ir. L.T. 61 (1947) and 64
So. Afr. L.J. 220 (1947). He now says, Gower, supra note 8, at 22, n.93: "the writer no
longer believes, as he did in his callow youth (see 9 M.L.R. at pp. 221 et seq.), that any
Government would have the courage to fuse the profession whether its leaders liked it
or not."
44 Cmd. No. 8878 ff 20 (1953); Gower, supra note 8. The legal aid scheme is dis-
cussed, inter alia, in Thompson, Developments in the British Legal Aid Experiment, 53
Col L. Rev. 789 (1953); Joyce, How the New Legal Aid Service Works in England,
20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 235 (1953); Jowitt, Legal Aid in England, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 757
(1949); Smith, The English Legal Assistance Plan: Its Significance for American Legal
Institutions, 35 A.B.A.J. 453 (1949); Abrahams, The English Legal Assistance Plan: A
Description of its Machinery, 36 id. 31 (1950); The British Legal Aid and Ad-ice Bill,
59 Yale L.J. 320 (1950).
45 Gower, supra note 8, at 18-23.
46 As he points out, Gower, supra note 8, at 19 and n., retention of present lim-
itations on the scope of appeal from the County Courts is contra to the Committee's
recommendation. See also note 24 supra.
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with interchangeable personnel, so that all parts can be kept equally
operable; but it is not a court piled in a heap. Indeed for a decentral-
ized court to be at the same time efficient, the control of an adminis-
trative director and chief justice is more than ever necessary.
So this proposal is attractive. Its approach to the question of
fusion of the profession is at least ingenious. Since barristers are not
required in the County Courts, since very likely they, or many of them,
may not wish to leave London, a kind of fusion may develop of its own
accord where solicitors may perform the duties of trial counsel in these
then important courts. Perhaps here is a bit of oversimplification, at
least as a matter of hope or prophecy. For the division may not so
easily die, and reform somewhat by indirection may not actually occur.
If the public still feels that London justice is worth the cost and if so-
licitors still brief the stylish barrister of the Inns of Court, then County
Court justice will inevitably bear a stigma in comparison with what
others can pay for. On the other hand, such a reform might well work
a reorganization of activity whereby the barrister might become the
leading adviser to business and industry in London, the commercial
center of the country, while litigation went more and more to others in
other places. At any rate it would mark a development of absorbing
interest to students both of the law and of social change.
It is not practicable here to go into others of the many interesting
suggestions contained in this Report. Enough has been said, it is
hoped, to show the interest it arouses, as well as the kinds of questions
it suggests but does not answer. Perhaps one further thought may be
ventured. The Committee uncovers drives for court improvement
not only in its own country and in America, but in Canada and Aus-
tralia, which show a consistent and widespread purpose to achieve bet-
ter court administration. It is perhaps unfortunate that there is so
little interchange of the knowledge thus acquired and of the good will
for reform and so little pooling of interests. In the United States the
diversity is of course particularly great because of the diverse juris-
dictions showing still so many types of procedure and of reform. Per-
haps there ought to be a united body of advisory committees and of
procedure commissions to serve as a clearing house and common meet-
ing ground for all procedural reformers who should be blood brothers
under the skin.4 7 Among our many organizations there ought to be
room for another which would bring together those in various parts
of the world following the English law who are charged with official
responsibility of trying to keep the tools of justice always bright.
47 A suggestion of this kind, although limited to American committees, was pre-
sented in an important address by Dean Pirsig of Minnesota, member of the Advisory
Committee of the Supreme Court of the United States on Rules of Civil Procedure,
before the Section of Judicial Administration of the ABA at Boston in August, 1953.
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